A Patent to Rule Them All: Forum Shopping in European Patent Litigation and the Quest for a Community Patent

As the European Union realizes the economic advantages of the internal market, and its Member States (fitfully) move closer to becoming a single economic entity, European patent law nevertheless remains highly national in character.  Patent protection in Europe is granted under two parallel regimes: the national patent system; and the regime of the European Patent Convention (EPC).  National patents are issued by, and afford protection within, individual states, whereas the EPC provides a centralized administration for the issuance of ‘bundled’ national patents by the European Patent Organization (EPO).  The ‘European patent’ granted by the EPO does not constitute a unitary patent extending throughout Europe, but rather grants national patent protection in each EPC state specified in the patent application.  Both regimes operate independently of the EU; in fact, the EPC regime extends to non-EU states.

The EPC seeks to harmonize European substantive patent law by providing uniform rules for European patents, including in relation to: the extent of protection (art 69); patentability (arts 52-57); and revocation (art 138).  Uniformity is thwarted, however, by the fact that implementation and interpretation of these rules is left to national law (and national courts), and there currently exists no supranational judicial mechanism for ensuring the harmonization of national patent laws.

At the same time, generously construed rules on jurisdiction commonly permit patent litigants in Europe a choice of fora, and therefore an opportunity to engage in ‘forum shopping’.   Where a suit for patent infringement (or non-infringement) involves a defendant domiciled in an EU Member State, national courts of Member States must exercise jurisdiction in accordance with the Brussels Regulation (or Lugano Convention).

Under this regime, suit may be brought before the courts of the defendant’s domicile (art 2), or in the state(s) in which an infringing product was manufactured or sold in breach of a local patent (art 5(3)).  Dutch courts have even exercised jurisdiction over foreign defendants for violations of foreign patents, under art 6(1), where the defendant companies constitute a corporate group, and the head corporation of the group is domiciled in the Netherlands (see, e.g., Expandable Grafts Partnership v. Boston Scientific B.V., F.S.R., 352 [1999]; Solvay S.A. v. Honeywell Fluorine Products Europe B.V., District Court The Hague, Case No. 09-227 [2010]).

In recent years, the ECJ has made clear that a restrictive view is to be taken of the special bases of jurisdiction of the Brussels Regulation (see, e.g., Shevill v. Presse Alliance, 1995 E.C.R. I-415; Gesellschaft für Antriebstechnik m.b.H. & Co. K.G. v Lamellen und Kupplungsbau Beteiligungs K.G., 2006 E.C.R. I-06509; Roche Nederland B.V. v. Primus, 2006 E.C.R I-06535).  Some commentators consequently expected forum shopping in European patent litigation to be significantly curtailed.  Due to what these cases left open for forum shoppers, however, forum shopping remains prevalent.

Forum shopping both reveals and exacerbates economic inefficiencies arising from discordant national patent laws in Europe.  Allowing litigants an “often outcome-determinative” choice of court – borne out in widely varying ‘win-rates’ between European fora – distorts the economic policy balance which national patent laws strike between incentivizing innovation and competition.

Thus, reform is much needed in the European patent system.  Properly structured, a ‘Community patent’, extending unitary protection across Europe, would address the legal disunity that results in forum shopping.  One commentator has noted, however, that “[t]he Community patent seems to become less acceptable the more it is needed”.  Both the Community Patent Convention of 1975, and the Luxembourg Convention of 1989, proposed a Community patent, but failed to obtain sufficient ratification by EU Member States.  In 2000, the European Commission put forward a draft Community Patent Regulation, designed to “complement” the EPC regime, but negotiations between Member States broke down in 2004.

The reasons for the failure of these proposals are manifold.  Primarily, however, each failed: (i) to develop mutually acceptable mechanisms for judicial enforcement and revocation of patent protection at the Community level; and (ii) to adequately address the cost of filing and translating patent specifications in each jurisdiction.

Most recently, in 2007, the European Commission presented a proposal for a Community Patent Regulation, under which the EPO would be responsible for granting a Community patent extending unitary protection throughout EPC member states.  At the same time, an autonomous European and Community Patents Court would be established to decide all patent actions.  In 2011, however, the ECJ held this proposed regime to be inconsistent with EU law.  The Regulation would impermissibly divest national courts of first instance jurisdiction over patent disputes, and invest the Community Patents Court with the responsibility of interpreting and applying not only the envisaged international agreement, but also Community law (see E.C.J. Opinion 1/09 of 8 March 2011).  Thus, as of 2011, a Community Patent for Europe remains elusive.

In light of these failed efforts, it is suggested that the following structural elements be considered when formulated a new Community patent regime.  Although a tenable proposal would of course need to be much more comprehensive, it is hoped that this discussion contributes to the Community Patent debate.  First, national patent regimes should be phased out in EU Member States.  Thus, only a Community patent would be available, which would be issued, infringed, or revoked as a whole.  Secondly, a new Regulation under EC Treaty Article 308 should provide substantive Community patent law, and set minimum procedural standards for European patent litigation.  Thirdly, although national courts must retain first instance jurisdiction in patent cases, these courts should be limited in number and specialized in hearing patent matters.  Fourthly, a Common Patent Court should be established as a second instance court of appeal at the Community level, attached to the ECJ Court of First Instance.  The existence of appeal courts at the Community level would further the goal of substantive harmonization of European patent law.  Moreover, the ECJ should operate as a court of referral on questions of Community patent law, from national or Community courts.

In order to limit ‘torpedo’ actions, it is further suggested that current rules on jurisdiction be buttressed by a mandatory preliminary hearing on jurisdiction in national courts.  And, if such a preliminary ruling is not made by a first-seized national court within six months of filing, an application should be available to the Community Patent Court for a binding ruling on the first-seized court’s jurisdiction.  Finally, in order to overcome the controversial matter of translation requirements, a patentee should be required, at the time of filing, to translate patent claims into the official languages of Member States.  Translations of patent specifications (a more costly enterprise), should be required only prior to the commencement of patent litigation. (Notably, technological innovation may soon resolve this issue, as automated translations are already being employed by the EPO in respect of certain languages).

As former EU Commissioner Frits Bolkestein has stated, the failure to agree on a Community patent regime “undermines the credibility of the whole enterprise to make Europe the most competitive economy in the world”.  Indeed, Europe has been criticized for being less successful than other regions at converting its “excellent scientific base” into new products and market share.  EU Member States should once again return to the negotiation table, with the knowledge that political compromise will assuredly beget significant economic reward.

Owen Webb